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Abstract 
There is a difference between theory and theorizing. One way or another, theory is central to 
organisation of most academic disciplines: for example, as a framework of concepts that 
expresses preoccupations, that codifies linkages, that relates discoveries, that raises questions. 
But theorizing is the becoming of theory: for example, running into problems, feeling 
perplexity, creating space, forming concepts, finding time, condensing frameworks, forcing 
conclusions – a living reality that is (for reasons explored below) neglected as a topic of 
inquiry. I address this deficiency here by engaging with theorizing as a legitimate, perhaps 
inescapable theme, albeit one that remains elusive and that must as far as possible be grasped 
directly as it occurs. In developing this engagement, I suggest that the philosophy of Deleuze 
and Guattari offers an appropriate point of departure and – through a reading of Difference and 
Repetition and What is Philosophy?, and through a synthesis of this with the experience of 
theorizing – I draw out the components of a Deleuzian theory of theorizing. 
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Introduction 
 
One way or another theory is central to the organisation of most academic disciplines 
– from the natural and the social sciences to the humanities and the arts. Each strand 
of human geography, for example, is imbued with a series of assumptions and pre-
occupations that are conveyed in a body of theories, and each strand implies a series 
of themes and questions that expand upon these theories: “thinking about theory is not 
an optional extra but a necessary part of doing geographical research”1. Beyond the 
academy, however, theory is also central to the development of contemporary culture, 
not only through the impact of science and technology, but also through the theories 
that are invoked by practitioners in accountancy and finance, business and child-care, 
politics and marketing, literature and the arts. It may no longer be possible to believe 
in the idea of progress, or to credit the rationalisation of society, but it is both possible 
and necessary to acknowledge the rise of theory as a form of cultural power.  
 
In the Cartesian-Kantian tradition, the power of theory lies in the capacity of theorizing 
to reach across the dividing line between two mutually exclusive realms – between 
mind and matter, or subject and object. More specifically, this power lies in the capacity 
of reason as a transcendental reality (the “inner light” of the soul), to grasp the logic 
that informs a transcendent reality (the world beyond sensations), and to convey this 
logic to the empirical subject 2 . The Cartesian image of theory is by no means 
unproblematic, however, and has provoked on-going re-examination through a second 
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round of theorizing that is applied to theory itself, and that – as critique – produces the 
characteristic forms of contemporary meta-theory. Critique was, for example, the 
method used by Descartes to perceive that truth is revealed in clear and distinct 
perceptions. It was also the method used by Kant to theorize the necessary limits of 
theoretical reason. Even Nietzsche, who took a hammer to Cartesianism, did so 
through a reasoned critique of reason and theory: “Learn from out of this fool’s book, 
how reason can be brought – “to reason””3. During the twentieth century, the method 
of critique migrated to the social sciences where it produced waves of critical theory – 
dialectical, phenomenological, structuralist, poststructuralist, feminist, postcolonial – 
that addressed reason and theory as historical, cultural or linguistic artefacts4. But, 
whether in philosophy or in the social sciences, critical meta-theories have responded 
to an image of theorizing-as-transcendence – asking, for example, whether theory as a 
social construct can really represent transcendent(al) reality.  
 
The rediscovery of Hegel and Nietzsche in the 1960s was, however, accompanied by 
the rediscovery of Spinoza. The starting point for Spinoza is not a dichotomy between 
mind and matter that is mediated by reason, but a unified God or nature to which mind 
and body, thought and extension, belong as attributes. The faculty of reason no longer 
supervenes mysteriously upon sensation and understanding from a realm beyond, but 
belongs to nature and imbues both thought and extension with an inherent 
intelligibility. Indeed, for Spinoza reason is not a faculty at all, but a practice that is 
aligned to the pursuit of virtue: the more we think the more adequate our ideas, the 
more adequate our ideas the more powerful our actions, the more powerful our actions 
the more joyful and ethical our lives. From this perspective the power of theory is 
secured not by developing a critical meta-theory that governs the process of 
theorizing, but by expressing and explicating the intelligibility of theorizing itself as a 
practice5. To paraphrase Montag: “[theorizing] does not represent or express a more 
primary reality; it is itself fully and irreducibly real” 6 . The philosophy of Spinoza 
therefore creates the potential for another kind of meta-theory, one that responds to 
an image of theorizing-as-expression – asking, for example, how and in what ways 
theorizing is the becoming of theory. The influence of Spinoza is evident in Althusser’s 
concept of “theoretical practice”, but it is also evident in Deleuze’s treatment of thought 
and of philosophy7.  
 
My project in this paper is to address the experience of theorizing as a living reality, as 
a style of reasoning, and as the becoming of theory. So far, this project has been 
introduced here by locating a deficiency in the meta-theoretical landscape, a deficiency 
to which the paper offers a response. But another starting point would be to describe 
the moments of intellectual disturbance and engagement from which the project 
emerged. One such moment occurred, for example, at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Association of Geographers in 2014, where I noticed that most of the 
presentations faced simultaneously in two directions – offering a theory of their chosen 
subject that was supported by an account of the production of this theory, or by a 
simulation of this production that implied such an account. The purpose of such self-
accounts was in each case to provide a rationale for the theory that was being 
presented – for example, a deficiency to which the theory responded. It was this vein 
of reflexivity that prompted my initial question here: if the presentation of most 
theories is accompanied by allusions to their genesis, what is the relationship of a 
theory to the circumstances of its genesis?8 Subsequently, this question was expanded 
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by drawing upon remarks made by Anderson and Harrison in their account of non-
representational theory, where they explained that they required a plausible “origins 
myth” for this theory9. The scepticism that these authors directed towards standard 
self-accounts suggested that there may be a divergence between the theory that is 
produced, the manner of its production, and the account that is given of this 
production. The issues that emerge here are several, including:  
 
i. the adequacy of the embedded self-accounts of the genesis of theories;  
ii. the ways in which theorizing can be accounted for adequately;  
iii. the genesis of the embedded self-account of the genesis of a theory; 
iv. the consistency between the genesis of theory, the self-account of this genesis, 
and the theory that is generated. 
 
In this paper the deficiencies of the meta-theoretical landscape, and these four points 
of intellectual disturbance, are approached through an inquiry into the becoming of 
theory. Although elusive, the reality of theorizing involves a series of open-ended 
events – for example, running into problems, finding time, reading books, long 
conversations, mind wandering, articulating questions, crystallising strategies, making 
space, consulting friends and foes, recording thoughts, dreaming of solutions, 
condensing frameworks, collecting data, playing with connections, cleaning up results, 
removing stepping stones, selecting conclusions. To study theorizing as a living reality, 
an approach is required that captures this reality directly as it occurs – which, in the 
present context, suggests that I must try to capture the theorizing that is occurring 
here, in the preparation of this paper. Such an approach may seem improbable, but it 
builds upon the Spinozan or Deleuzian view of knowledge as true when it explicates 
its own intelligibility 10 . It also suggests that different accounts of theorizing will 
emerge from different styles of theorizing – accounts that are (for example) differently 
gendered and racialized11. In the next section I describe the development of thinking 
around theorizing, and I explore certain problems associated with meta-theory as 
currently constituted. Deleuze does not distinguish between theory and philosophy, 
but from a reading of Difference and Repetition and of What is Philosophy?, and from 
the synthesis of this reading with the experience of theorizing, I draw out such a 
distinction, and I present the contours of a Deleuzian theory of theorizing.  
 
Theorizing-as-transcendence 
 
In the language of ancient Greece, the theoroi were pilgrims who witnessed a sacred 
spectacle, whilst theorein was the illumination that they received and communicated. 
The meaning of theoria was, however, generalised at the hands of early philosophers 
to include all encounters with a transcendental reality from which illumination could 
be derived. In the allegory of the Cave, for example, Plato suggests that theorizing 
involves a detachment from the ignorance of everyday life, and the passage to a 
transcendental realm of pure forms or Ideas that shapes the world of experience, and 
that can be grasped directly by intellects with the capacity for reason 12 . In the 
Cartesian-Kantian tradition the idea of theorizing was, however, complicated by the 
distinction that was drawn between transcendental ideas, transcendent objects, and 
the empirical subject or “I”. The classical image of theorizing-as-transcendence was 
therefore amplified to encompass the journey of reason across these three realms. This 
image was by no means unproblematic, however, and was indeed vulnerable to the 
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twin dangers of scepticism (radical doubt regarding experience) and dogmatism 
(exorbitant claims reflecting beliefs). A second round of theorizing was therefore 
required that would, through the self-examination of reason, review and revise the 
foundations of theory.  
 
In the Cartesian tradition, theory is therefore not only the product of a daemonic 
reason that travels across transcendent(al) realms, it is also the product of a reason 
that encounters itself in making this journey. However, the effect of such an encounter 
is to divide theory into “higher” and “lower” tiers, a higher meta-theoretical explanans 
and a lower theoretical explanandum. In responding to the vulnerabilities of the 
Cartesian paradigm, the second tier of theorizing – known as critique – has evolved 
over time through three overlapping phases: from the limitation of theory (in, for 
example, Kant and Husserl); through the rejection of theory (in, for example, Nietzsche 
and Heidegger); to the reduction of theory (in, for example, Foucault and Derrida). In 
this section I discuss these phases in turn, and I identify their problematic 
consequences.  
 
Limitation 
 
The purpose of Kant’s first critique was to defend the power of reason and theory 
against the dangers of scepticism and dogmatism. This task was approached by 
theorizing knowledge, including science, as the product of a cooperation between 
faculties of the subject – in particular, the faculty of intuition (with its a priori forms of 
sensibility) and the faculty of understanding (with its a priori concepts and 
categories)13. However, although these faculties both belong to the subject, according 
to Kant they are dependent for their efficacy upon (on the one hand) the transcendent 
and unknowable thing-in-itself, and (on the other hand) the transcendental and 
regulative ideas of reason (such as “God”)14. Kant arrives at this meta-theory through 
a self-examination of reason that involves an internal division between higher and 
lower – critical and speculative – tiers of theory, in which the former both explains and 
governs the latter15. “Speculatio” is a Latin translation of “theoria” and, although this 
performs an important role, it is also a source of illusions: “theoretical cognition is 
speculative if it pertains to an object … to which one cannot attain in any experience”16. 
It is only by developing the critical branch of theory, as Kant does, that reason can 
achieve the self-knowledge it requires to represent reality, and to rein in its own 
speculative tendencies. However, as Hegel points out, the process of critique itself 
presupposes the very foundations – the self-knowledge of Reason – that it is supposed 
to provide17.  
 
Rejection 
 
In his attack upon the tenets of Cartesianism, Nietzsche’s thinking is necessarily 
informed by these tenets. Indeed his philosophy can be regarded as a radicalisation of 
Kant, that retains a central role for the subject in the production of knowledge. But this 
subject is now a fragmentary body that is motivated, not by transcendental reason, but 
by a series of ignoble drives and instincts 18 . At the same time, both the realm of 
transcendental ideas and the realm of transcendent objects are abandoned. As his 
philosophy evolves, Nietzsche offers a range of meta-theories by which to expose 
Cartesian reason – for example, presenting this as a repository of lies (such the stability 
  5 
 
of “being”) that are useful to the struggle for survival19. In an early work (The Birth of 
Tragedy) Nietzsche criticises Socrates for presenting the “theoretical man” as a new 
ideal, and he argues that Socratic intellectualism is an expression of the decadent will 
to power20. In a later work (Thus Spoke Zarathustra) Nietzsche presents the positive 
scientist as a “pedant of the spirit” who loses sight of higher knowledge21. Nietzsche’s 
goal is to replace reason with instinct, concept with metaphor, and theory with poetry; 
but in pursuing this goal he himself relies upon reason, concept and theory. This 
tension is managed by dividing theory into higher and lower tiers – Nietzsche’s and 
other people’s – and by pursuing a critique of the latter that, if applied even-handedly, 
would also encompass the former22.  
 
Reduction 
 
Like Nietzsche, Foucault diverges from the Cartesian paradigm in ways that are 
marked by this paradigm. His goal is to challenge the Kantian claim to have discovered 
the universal conditions of knowledge. Foucault pursues this goal by extending the 
Nietzschean critique of the subject and its reason, removing these from the centre of 
knowledge production and presenting them both as historical artefacts. He develops a 
style of critique that is “Archaeological – and not transcendental – in the sense that it 
will not seek to identify the universal structures of all knowledge” 23 . In his later 
genealogies, such as Discipline and Punish, Foucault presents meta-theories that 
challenge the authority of repressive concepts (such as “discipline”) by revealing their 
origins in historical contingency 24 . However, despite his rejection of 
transcendentalism, history plays a role in Foucault’s meta-theories that resembles that 
of the subject for Kant – as the transcendental source of a priori categories that 
articulate our thinking. There is also a division in Foucault’s philosophy between 
“lower” and “higher” tiers of theory – between cultural theories that derive their 
authority from their supposed universality, and Foucauldian meta-theories that 
dispute this claim to universality. But if, as seems likely, Foucault’s meta-theories 
present historical relativism as itself a relative truth, then the authority of these meta-
theories is no greater than the authority of the theories they seek to challenge.   
 
Despite their different orientations, during each of these phases the Cartesian critique 
has had two unfortunate consequences. First, whilst the division of theory into higher 
and lower tiers has allowed the problems with theorizing-as-transcendence to be 
exposed, this division has in the same move also reproduced these problems at a 
higher, meta-theoretical level. Secondly, scepticism towards the transcendental 
aspirations of theory has obscured the experience of theorizing as the becoming of 
theory, and has produced the occlusion of this experience as a topic of inquiry. Over 
time the influence of critique has extended across all branches of cultural knowledge 
and has, for example, urged the replacement of grand theory by minor theory, and 
strong theory by weak theory.25 But rarely if ever has it addressed theorizing directly 
as an experience and as a practice26. In the next section I explore the possibility of a 
different kind of meta-theory, one that conceptualises theorizing-as-expression. 
 
Theorizing-as-expression 
 
The influence of Spinoza upon Deleuzean thought is evident from his commitment to 
immanence, and to expression as the power that articulates attributes and modes27. 
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In Difference and Repetition and in What is Philosophy? this power is explicated further 
as a circuit of genesis that gives rise to thought and extension, and to individuated 
subjects and objects 28. Although different from one another in focus and scope, these 
books present similar architectures, and although neither offers an account of 
theorizing, they analyse thought and philosophy in ways that permit such an account.  
 
Circuit of Genesis 
 
Towards the beginning of his career, in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze focuses on 
the problem of thought, but he departs from the dualistic treatment of this that he finds 
in Kant29. In the Kantian system, our understanding of the world is grounded upon an 
active relationship in which the evidence of the senses is assimilated to pre-existing 
identities – objects and subjects – under the guidance of the categories, a process that 
Kant calls ‘representation’. The generality of Kant’s categories means, however, that 
his method can only account for possible experience, and it is to overcome this 
limitation that Deleuze proposes an alternative approach that can investigate the 
grounds of real experience30. Deleuze locates these grounds not in a transcendental 
unity patterned after God, but in a dimension of virtuality that is immanent within the 
real, that expresses difference rather than identity, and that operates affectively upon 
consciousness. Beneath the active syntheses of Kant, Deleuze therefore discovers 
layers of passive synthesis, in which both the understanding and the intuition are 
constituted out of the encounter with sensible forces – energetic differences between 
differences that are given to pre-subjective experience.  
 
For Deleuze everything, including thought, follows from such encounters, which 
initiate a circuit of six syntheses (three passive and three active) that lead from the 
apprehension of differences and repetitions, through the release of problems (and the 
production of time and space) to the individuation of objects31. During the passive 
syntheses, sensible encounters provoke the emergence of a nascent subject that moves 
from seeing itself in objects to contemplating itself directly, becoming the faculty of 
thought32. In the absence of the Kantian unity of apperception, however, this subject 
disintegrates, and there follows a hiatus in which differences are freed from the 
nascent subject to become a cloud of virtual problems. Deleuze appropriates Kant’s 
concept of the Idea as an irreducible web of problems that exceeds knowledge. But 
unlike Kant, Deleuzian problems are not transcendental in origin but emerge 
immanently as virtual pressures that are latent within the actual world of experience33. 
Three active syntheses complete the circuit by combining intensities with Ideas to 
determine problems and to produce solutions in the form of individuated objects and 
subjects34.  
 
At the end of their careers, in What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari narrow their 
focus to the genesis of philosophy. But this genesis is itself located within the wider 
genesis of thought, and their account follows a similar trajectory to the one presented 
above – from three passive syntheses (Art), through a liberating hiatus (Philosophy), 
to three active syntheses (Science)35. Art in this context is the product of pre-reflective 
encounters with forces that draw the sensed (percept) and the sensing (affect) 
together, and that order the resulting sensations. This ordering is, however, dissolved 
by the subsequent detachment of sensations from their material forms, and there is a 
hiatus in which a web of free-floating problems emerges and is engaged by philosophy. 
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We are told that philosophy is “the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating 
concepts”36. The philosopher is a friend of the concept who releases its potential by 
engaging its components in responding to problems, but the desire of the philosopher 
implies a claim to wisdom that entails both friendship and rivalry with other thinkers. 
It is the process of agonism (the hand-to-hand combat of energies in response to a web 
of problems) that gives rise to concepts37.  
 
The completion of this circuit then involves a sequence of active syntheses, in which 
virtual concepts intersect with a web of problems (plane of immanence), and are 
selected by these in the production of extended objects, the functions of science and 
the subjectivities of scientists38.There is, however, a coda to this discussion. In his book 
on Foucault, Deleuze criticises philosophy for ignoring the dependence of thinking on 
the intrusion of an outside39. In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari also tell us 
that beneath every plane of immanence is “THE plane of immanence … that which must 
be thought and that which cannot be thought. It is the nonthought within thought. … 
an outside more distant than any external world because it is an inside deeper than 
any internal world: it is immanence” 40 . As immanence, the Outside comprises a 
productive limit that operates before, during and after the circuit of genesis. 
 
Scale of genesis 
 
The accounts sketched above share broadly the same model of expression, involving a 
circuit of three moments – Art, Philosophy and Science. This circuit is initiated by the 
encounter with virtual forces, and moves through a series of passive syntheses to 
produce a nascent subject (Art). The failure of these syntheses and the disintegration 
of this subject leads to a hiatus in which a milieu of problems and Ideas is revealed, and 
concepts are created in response (Philosophy). Finally, there follows a series of active 
syntheses that brings conceptual frameworks into conjunction with a web of problems, 
and that produces individuated objects and subjects (including theories and theorists) 
as solutions (Science). But the abstract nature of this model raises questions about the 
scale at which it is supposed to operate. It might, for example, be thought to describe 
genesis on an historical scale, through successive episodes of world evolution; or it 
might describe a progressive awakening of the faculties, through stages of 
psychological development on a biographical scale. In the present context, however, I 
suggest that the model is a description of the on-going (re)creation of the world on a 
moment-by-moment or ontological scale. This interpretation is more consistent with 
Deleuze other writings, and implies (for example) that there is a plurality of coexisting 
circuits at different stages of completion that can interact with one another 41.  
 
The genesis and structure of theorizing 
 
An important moment during the theorizing that is condensed here was the encounter 
with Deleuzian philosophy, an encounter that is to some extent reprised in the above 
conceptual framework. Although focussing on common sense, thought and philosophy, 
this framework is presented here because, in a modified form, it offers a perspective 
on the different but related subject of theorizing. The framework itself suggests, 
however, that conceptual frameworks are produced and modified in a circuit of genesis 
that involves the three moments of Art, Philosophy, and Science, and that the third of 
these involves the encounter between concepts and problems. To produce a theory of 
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theorizing my next step is, therefore, to bring the framework into conjunction with the 
events of the theorizing expressed here, starting with the genesis of theorizing in Art 
and Philosophy, and proceeding to the structure of theorizing in Science. Table 1 lists 
some of the events that occurred in building towards the present theory. 
 
 
 
Table 1: the iterations of theorizing condensed here. 
  
PREPARATION INITIATION FIRST 
OPENING 
FIRST CLOSING SECOND 
OPENING 
SECOND 
CLOSING 
THIRD CLOSING 
Concern with 
reflexivity and 
its limitation 
by certain 
blind spots. 
Conference 
time, place, and 
atmosphere. 
Sketch of 
non-
represent-
ational 
theory (NRT) 
Useful germs – 
the event, 
agonism, the 
unthought 
Rereading 
and 
sketching 
What is 
Philosophy? 
Developing 
an account of 
the 
unthought 
Responding to 
reviewer 
comments by 
reconsidering the 
theoretical 
context; 
Awareness of 
theorizing as a 
living process, 
and of its 
occlusion. 
Observation 
that theorizing 
faces in two 
directions. 
Awareness of 
the neglect of 
theorizing by 
other 
theories 
Account of 
theorizing as 
reflexivity; the 
sense of a 
closing 
Provisional 
conceptual 
framework; 
consulting 
friends and 
foes 
Forming a 
model of 
theorizing as 
selection and 
agonism  
Widening the 
context away 
from NRT to 
meta-theoretical 
critiques; 
Awareness of 
the de-
constructive 
role of genesis.  
 
Sensing an 
opening: how 
do theories 
account for 
theorizing? 
Strategic 
focus on 
reflexivity in 
theory. 
Collapse of the 
first account, 
end of an 
episode 
First 
explication of 
the concept 
of theorizing 
Forming a 
model of 
theorizing as 
actualization 
and event 
Formulating the 
contrast between 
theory-as-
transcendence 
and theory-as-
expression;  
Sensitivity to 
the Deleuzian 
problematic of 
re-
presentation.  
First sketch of 
an account of 
the genesis of 
theories out of 
resistance to 
common sense.  
Rereading 
and 
sketching 
Difference 
and 
Repetition 
Renewed focus 
on theorizing, 
sense of a new 
opening more 
detached from 
reflexivity. 
Drawing out 
the nascent 
art of 
thinking from 
affective 
force-fields 
New sense of 
a closing; 
more 
consultation; 
awareness of 
further 
problems. 
Aligning this 
contrast with the 
Deleuzian theory 
of theorizing. 
 
 
Art 
 
The Deleuzian framework suggests that thinking originates in a series of three passive 
syntheses that emerge from pre-conceptual encounters. As implied at the beginning of 
this paper, one starting point for the present work was the sensory milieu created by 
an international conference, an experience that fostered a climate of thinking. The 
combination of an unfamiliar downtown and a bright airy hall worked subliminally to 
produce a receptivity and an engagement that allowed new associations to be 
imagined 42 . However, although fleeting, the world of the conference was already 
populated by tacit problems and ambient theories that arrived, with the delegates 
(including myself), from earlier circuits. In Deleuzian terms, such theories subsist as 
percepts and affects that retain experience aesthetically as well as conceptually 43 . 
Theories, like paintings and sculptures, are therefore felt – as powers and frailties, as 
beauties and monstrosities – before they are thought, and they convey a force field of 
problems that colours the landscape and comprises a plane of immanence 44 . The 
concept of style describes this pre-conceptual context: “style is not the external or 
accidental adornment of a message; it is the creation of affects from which speakers 
and messages are discerned”45 The aesthetic impulse is an important driver in the 
production of knowledge, and a further starting point for the present thinking was the 
aesthetic impact of pre-existing circuits across the conference.  
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Philosophy 
 
Problems for Deleuze are irreducible dilemmas that belong to objects as well as to 
thoughts, while Ideas are relations between reciprocally determined problem 
elements that subsist as virtual pressures within a plane of immanence46. Ideas are 
sometimes conflated with concepts in commentaries on Deleuze, but I retain the 
distinction here between Ideas as bundles of problems, and concepts as solutions to 
problems. The thinking that was facilitated by the sensations described above was 
initiated by an observation of reflexivity that was expressed in my initial question: 
what is the relationship of a theory to the circumstances of its genesis? The Deleuzian 
framework suggests that, while all thinking responds to virtual problems, thinking 
becomes philosophy when it responds to problems by creating concepts. One 
consequence of my problematic has therefore been the quest for a new concept of 
“theorizing”, one that avoids the Cartesian daemon and falls naturally out of the 
Deleuzian framework.  
 
 
Figure 1: The concept of “theorizing”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It can be deduced from the Deleuzian framework that thinking, common sense, 
philosophy and theorizing are all concepts in the Deleuzian sense – assemblages with 
irregular boundaries that are coordinated with one another, and with other concepts 
(such as art and science) that respond to the same plane of immanence47. However, to 
modify the framework to include theorizing, I need to explore more closely the 
relationships amongst these concepts. It can reasonably be suggested that theorizing 
occurs within the horizon that is provided by thinking, as a kind of thinking; that 
philosophy occurs within the horizon that is provided by theorizing, as a kind of 
theorizing; and that common sense occurs within the horizon that is provided by both 
of these as a kind of thinking or of theorizing. Thinking therefore includes theorizing, 
but is a wider concept that also includes (for example) the common sense negotiation 
of problems encountered in everyday life. Likewise, theorizing includes philosophy, 
but is a wider concept that includes not only philosophy but also (for example) 
common sense, science and social science. Theorizing can therefore be articulated as a 
Deleuzian concept by its insertion as a middle term into this ecology, and by its 
THINKING       THEORIZING            ART  
Common Sense            
Philosophy 
Science            
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interpretation as the expression and explication of intelligibility, or of sense, through 
the articulation of concepts and frameworks (Figure 1).  
 
So far, the conjunction of the Deleuzian framework with the experience of theorizing 
suggests that, although thinking emerges from Art, theorizing proper is sparked by the 
engagement of thinking with Ideas, and it emerges first in the form of Philosophy, 
second in the form of Science. This account can, however, be expanded by moving the 
conjunction from the philosophical to the scientific phase, and from considerations of 
the genesis of theorizing to a consideration of its structure. 
 
Science 
 
The Deleuzian framework suggests that during the third, scientific, moment the 
concepts forged by philosophy will intersect with the web of problems that emerge 
from art. In the present case, it is the Deleuzian conceptual framework itself that 
intersects with the problem of theorizing experienced here. This intersection reveals 
three interwoven dimensions of synthesis that are hinted at in Table 1 – of theory and 
theorizing (actualisation), of agonism and the plane of immanence (selection), and of 
opening and closing (event). It also reveals the limitation imposed by a fourth 
dimension – of the unthought – that is both within and beyond theorizing.  
 
Actualisation 
As indicated in the introduction and in Table 1, this paper concerns the relationship of 
theory to theorizing. A distinction is drawn by Deleuze between two levels of the event 
– between “real events on the level of engendered solutions, and ideal events 
embedded in the conditions of the problem”, with the “real” being actual and the “Ideal” 
being virtual48. From this perspective, thinking and knowledge are therefore events 
which occupy these two levels: the virtual event of thinking or theorizing, and the 
actual event of knowledge or theory: 
 
1. Thinking is conduct that exposes and solves problems (differentiation). It is a 
childlike force that occurs at the intersection of different knowledge platforms 
(such as books and unconscious beliefs), that expresses the knowledge recorded 
across these platforms, and that adds to this knowledge in the solution of problems. 
2. Knowledge is the determination and solution to problems that is embodied as 
capacities across different platforms (memories, bodies and habits, DNA, tools and 
language, networks and archives, landscapes and urban systems) (differenciation). 
In its expression, existing knowledge conditions the creation of new thinking.  
 
The interchange between theorizing and theory is that between the virtual and actual 
levels of the event. In this context it is, however, possible to draw a distinction between 
embodied and enacted knowledge, and also between implicated and explicated 
knowledge49. Knowledge is embodied as a capacity in, for example, tools: the form of a 
boat embodies a series of provisional solutions to the problem of sailing under 
different conditions (the boat knows how to sail in different waters), knowledge that, 
through the capacities it offers, facilitates the conduct of sailing when sailor and boat, 
water and wind, intersect. Likewise, the form of a book embodies a series of 
provisional solutions to the problem of reading under different conditions (the book 
knows how to read in different places), knowledge that facilitates the conduct of 
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reading and thinking. However, the text of a book also embodies a series of provisional 
solutions to other problems such as sailing (the book also knows how to sail), 
knowledge that can be read and put to work in other circumstances. The knowledge 
that is embodied in boats and books is enacted in conduct such as sailing and reading 
(including theorizing), activities that express these latent capacities. Knowledge is also, 
however, implicated in boats and books – knowledge of the design, manufacture and 
distribution of these, and the improvements of contemporary over past solutions to 
problems going back to the dawn of time. The knowledge of sailing that is embodied in 
boats is different to the knowledge of boat building that is implicated in boats – boats 
know how to sail but not how to make other boats. However, close examination of tools 
allows us to explicate, through reverse engineering, some of the knowledge that is 
implicated there. Theorizing is a conduct that enacts the knowledge embodied in pre-
existing theories to create new concepts in which pre-existing theories and the 
knowledge of theorizing are both implicated. The theory presented here is an attempt 
to explicate and embody the knowledge of theorizing that is implicated in theories. 
 
Selection  
In the present theorizing conversations, agreements and disagreements, with friends 
and colleagues have played a formative role, as indicated in Table 1. Theories form out 
of an engagement with the problems that emerge from planes of immanence, but there 
are two sides to this: 
 
i. first, the formation of each theory is propelled by a process of agonism – a combat 
of energies that creates forces of friendship and rivalry, of engagement and 
detachment, of attraction and repulsion, amongst frameworks50.  
 
In the development of his theories, for example, Deleuze engages a series of Ideas (such 
as that of the Idea) that he discovers in Kant, while rejecting the common sense image 
of thought that he also finds in Kant – producing a philosophy that “finds its difference 
or its true beginning” in a struggle against this image51.  
 
ii. Secondly, however, each plane of immanence is a “sieve” or “logos”, a force field of 
problems and Ideas that selects concepts and frameworks, causing some to be 
taken up into theorizing while others are allowed to fade away52. 
 
It is in the articulation between propulsive agonisms (such as moments of intellectual 
engagement) and selective planes (for example, deficiencies in the theoretical 
landscape), an aleatory articulation that exceeds the consciousness of any theorist, that 
theorizing occurs. This articulation will involve different kinds of evidence – case 
study, fieldwork, survey – and it will argue for solutions that may or may not suit the 
planes of immanence concerned.  
 
Event 
A distinction is revealed in Table 1 between two phases of the event, between opening 
and closing. From this perspective, theorizing is the passage between these phases, 
each of which imposes different requirements en route towards a finished theory. At 
the outset, theorizing pursues the expansive logic of opening, where problems present 
themselves and the hunt for solutions is opened up. Towards the end, theorizing 
conforms to the contractive logic of closing, finalising solutions and presenting these 
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as inevitable. The logic of closing is a predominantly reflexive logic, which includes the 
presentation of a theory that negotiates friends and rivals, and that plots a viable 
pathway through ambient selection pressures.  The conditions of viability will not, 
however, have been met throughout the theorizing, which will have included episodes 
that were inconclusive or regressive. In the present case, for example, the genesis of 
this theory followed a sequence that is approximated in Table 1, whilst the 
presentation of the theory follows a different sequence. The closure of theorizing 
therefore involves the imposition of a retrospective teleology which suggests how 
theorizing could have occurred if its sense – its place in an evolving plane of immanence 
– had been known in advance. This teleology creates an image that informs the 
presentation as a whole, but is focussed particularly on those strands of reflexivity 
embedded within the presentation.  
 
It is therefore likely that a finished theory will occlude the real events of its theorizing, 
presenting a false image of these events – a genesis myth – that is embedded within 
the presentation. But Deleuze argues against this occlusion: “The event … must be 
understood, willed, and represented in that which occurs … to become worthy of what 
happens to us, and thus to will and release the event”53. Deleuze is therefore suggesting 
that all events should exhibit a reflexivity of this sort. So, how can a viable account – 
one that explicates its sense – be produced that also meets Deleuze’s injunction? 
Perhaps this is possible in a presentation that:  
 
a. responds to the imperative to reveal the event of theorizing in the presentation of 
a finished theory; 
b. manages the imperative to conceal the event of theorizing within the presentation 
of a finished theory;  
c. acknowledges the tensions within the theorizing between concealing and revealing 
its eventfulness.  
 
There is indeed a history of attempts to reveal the traces of becoming within the 
become, from the dialectics of Plato and Hegel to the art of Jackson Pollock. Tension 
between revealing and concealing eventfulness is a feature of the tension between 
opening and closing in all theorizing. But the responsibility to acknowledge this 
tension will be particularly acute for a theorizing that explicates the practice of 
theorizing, and that must acknowledge the passage between the phases of opening and 
closing while itself passing between these phases.  
 
The unthought 
For Deleuze the “outside” is the source of an unthought that also lies at the very heart 
of thought. Despite the opacity of the outside, it is possible to draw a distinction 
between two types of unthought, both of which are to be found within Deleuze’s (if not 
Foucault’s) conception: 
 
i. The de facto unthought includes both pre-reflective sensations and distributed 
events (such as planes of immanence) that, although resistant to consciousness, are 
open to exploration and create problems that invite solution.  
ii. The de jure unthought includes values (such as  
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑥
 or √-1 or ℵ0) and aporias (such 
as Richard’s paradox and Gödel’s incompleteness theorem) that, although they 
provoke thinking, comprise problems that resist solution54. 
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The unthought within thought that Deleuze highlights is, however, that of immanence 
itself, which inheres within thought as the event inheres at the surface of mixtures, and 
as sense inheres at the surface of propositions. The immanence of theorizing, whereby 
concepts emerge from a pre-reflective milieu, therefore eludes theory as a de jure 
unthought that sets limits to theorizing. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Towards the beginning I asked: if the presentation of most theories is accompanied by 
allusions to their genesis, what is the relationship of a theory to the circumstances of 
its genesis? This question has been approached here through a study of theorizing that 
draws upon the resources of Deleuze and Guattari in the production of a conceptual 
framework. The conjunction of this framework with the experience of theorizing has 
allowed me to redefine theory and theorizing, and to sketch the outlines of a theory of 
the genesis and structure of theorizing. As regards genesis, this theory suggests that 
thinking, which is a precursor for theorizing, emerges from the stimulus that is 
provided by the sensations associated not only with a conducive time and place, but 
also with the aesthetics of pre-existing theories (Art). The theory also suggests that 
theorizing as a concept articulates the differences amongst a series of other concepts 
including art, thinking, common sense, philosophy and science, and that as a practice it 
is the expression of concept-creation and sense-articulation which imbues both 
philosophy and science (Philosophy). Finally, while the theory claims that thinking 
emerges from sensation, it argues that theorizing proper is sparked by the engagement 
with problems, and that it emerges first in the form of philosophy, then in the form of 
science (Science). During its scientific phase theorizing is, in particular, the product of 
three interwoven syntheses – actualisation, selection and event – that, together with 
the dimension of the unthought (immanence) determine the sense and structure of 
theorizing as follows: 
 
i. Actualisation. Theorising occurs in the exchange between two levels of the event, 
between virtual theorizing and actual theory. Theorizing is the exposing and 
solving of problems that expresses and extends theory, whilst theory is the solution 
to problems that is discovered through and informs theorizing, and that is 
embodied and enacted, implicated and explicated in different platforms. 
ii. Selection. Theorizing occurs in the encounter between propulsive agonisms and 
selective planes of immanence. Agonism is the productive difference between 
friendly and rival theories in response to the problems expressed in a plane of 
immanence. The plane of immanence produces selection pressures that cause the 
influence of some theories to wax and others to wane. 
iii. Event. Theorizing occurs in the passage between two phases of the event, the 
expansive phase of opening, and the contractive phase of closing. The presentation 
of a theory is concerned less with the reality of theorizing, more with presenting a 
teleological image that situates a theory retrospectively in the context of other, 
agonistic theories around the same plane of immanence.   
iv. Unthought. Finally, theorizing occurs around an irreducible blind spot – a de jure 
unthought – at its edge and at its heart, an opacity that derives from an inescapable 
immanence that inheres within the events and sense of thinking and knowledge, 
and that sets limits to these and to the powers of immanence itself.  
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Figure 2: The four-dimensional structure of theorizing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
                                                  
 
 
 
 
 
Four issues were posed earlier concerning the adequacy of the embedded account of 
the genesis of a theory; the ways in which theorizing can be accounted for adequately; 
the genesis of the embedded account of the genesis of a theory; and the consistency 
between the genesis of theory, the self-account of this genesis, and the theory 
generated. The second of these issues is addressed in the theory of theorizing that is 
presented above. The first, third and fourth issues are addressed in the account of the 
articulation of agonism and selection, and of the tension between revealing and 
concealing the event of theorizing. At the beginning I argued that traditional meta-
theory has been pre-occupied with (securing or challenging) the image of theorizing-
as-transcendence. I pointed out that, whilst the resulting division of theory into higher 
and lower tiers has exposed the problems with this image, it has at the same time 
reproduced these problems at a higher, meta-theoretical level. I also noted that this 
preoccupation has obscured the experience of theorizing as the becoming of theory, 
and has produced the occlusion or repression of this experience as a topic of inquiry. 
In this paper I have argued that, by drawing upon the philosophy of Deleuze and 
Guattari, and upon the Spinozan perspective that they channel, another kind of theory 
can be developed that involves an image of theorizing-as-expression.  
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